Cladding related building fires

GRP

Indication is that Glass Fibres were first demonstrated in 1893, by an American glassmaker, Edward Drummond Libbey, at the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago which ran from May until October that year. Such fibres had been produced earlier but as individual examples and not mechanised. They had also been found naturally, glass formations of cooled lava stretched into thin strands, near lava fountains, cascades, or lava flows, known as Pele's hair (after the Hawaiian goddess of volcanoes) or witches' hair'.

What is now referred to as glass wool was first invented in the 1930s by researchers at Owens-Illinois, led by Games Slayter, who could produce large quantities of glass fibre efficiently and cheaply, with the first commercial product of available in 1936. Owens-Illinois also later used this fibre technology to patent a glass fiber-reinforced polyester resin product which marketed under the trade name Fiberglas. Owens-Illinois later partnered with Corning to produce and refine the material, which became a significant product for both companies

Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP) rain-screen cladding was not patented as a specific product, but the underlying technology of glass fibre reinforced plastic was developed in the 1930s. The combination of glass fibers and polyester resin, which forms the basis of Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP), was pioneered by researchers like Eric Owen from Owens-Illinois in 1936. Commercial production of the material, including its use in building applications, followed in the 1930s and 1940s.

ETICS or EIFS

ACM

Metal composite material (MCM) or more specifically aluminium composite material (ACM) with a polyethylene core, a type of combustible cladding, was first developed in Germany during the 1960s. Initially used in mattress production, it was later adopted for building facades due to its appealing characteristics. The original patent for Alucobond Aluminium Composite Panels (ACM) was filed in 1971 by Alusingen, in collaboration with BASF, under the company name Alusingen (later Alusuisse) with a patent term of 20 years.

This new product ACM was a lightweight, easy to handle, relatively inexpensive, attractive option for modern construction. However, the benefits come with a significant drawback: a high fire risk. It is clear today that the product held significant risks especially when used in combination with other combustible materials or installed in certain ways for example with gaps behind facilitating fire spread. However there is very little detail documentation about façade fires from 1971 to 1991, with the first major documented cladding fire being Knowsley Heights, Merseyside, UK in 1991, which used what was called a glass reinforced plastic (GRP) rain-screen cladding. The cladding was used as part of a refurbishment project , carried out in 1998 and aimed at addressing damp issues in the building, using a Class 0 GPR cladding, a "combustible polymer material" (in the Grenfell inquiry report).

The original patent for Alucobond Aluminium Composite Panels (ACM) was filed in 1971, meaning it expired in 1991. After the patent expiry, other manufacturers like Alcoa (Reynobond), Mitsubishi (Alpolic), and Etem (Etalbond) entered the market. Reynobond 55 utilised the original ACM technology patent from 1971, and the name “Reynobond” was officially trademarked in the U.S. on October 4, 1988, with production of Reynobond panels (including the 55 model) commencing around 1989.

Warnings about the fire risks associated with ACM cladding have been present since the 1990s. Despite this, it continued to be widely used even with some serious fire incidents occurring worldwide, though in some countries, regulations did prohibit the use of ACM with polyethylene cores on tall residential and public buildings. Today this approach of limiting use on tall buildings has also been taken in the UK, after the tragic Grenfell Tower fire. However, addressing the risks of existing buildings with such cladding remains an ongoing major challenge, involving complex and costly remediation efforts. See articles Accelerating the remediation of buildings with unsafe cladding in England.

Below is a reverse timeline highlighting major fires involving cladding that have occurred globally, some are high rise buildings some are now, however these all involve issues with combustible cladding in one form or another. These highlight how many fires had been taking place and that the risks were known, they don't highlight why such materials continued to be used and still are despite these examples.

[edit] 2020-2025

• 2025 June 14 – Marina Pinnacle, Dubai, UAE A 67story residential tower fire lean on cladding; no reported injuries amongst nearly 4,000 evacuees.
• 2024 February 22 – Valencia Residential Complex, Spain. 14-storey Alucobond ACM (polyethylene core) facade caught fire rapidly; 10 deaths, 15 injured
• 2023 April 15 – AlRas Residential Building, Dubai, UAE. Fire spread via non-compliant ACM cladding; 16 deaths and 9 injuries.
• 2021 - Torre dei Moro (Milan) & Torre Ambar (Madrid), Italy & Spain. Fires in ACM-clad towers widely reported; flames rapidly engulfed upper floors of both.
• 2019 June 9 – Samuel Garside House, Barking, London, UK. Woodclad balconies ignited from a barbecue, destroying 10 flats; no deaths, 2 injured. Although under 18m tall, combustible cladding contributed to rapid fire spread
• 2019 November - Bolton Cube fire, UK. A smaller building (<18m) with combustible façade panels caught fire quickly.
• 2017 July 14 – Marco Polo Condos, Honolulu, USA. High-rise fire damaged over 200 units; 4 deaths, 13 injured—cause undetermined but external factors suspected.
• 2017 June 14 – Grenfell Tower, London, UK. A fridge fire escalated into a catastrophic blaze spread by polyethylene-core ACM cladding, killing 72 and injuring 74
• 2016 - Neo Soho, Jakarta. Spread up multiple floors during construction through ACM cladding.
• 2016 - Ramat Gan high-rise, Israel. A minor internal fire rapidly spread externally via combustible insulation panels.
• 2015 – The Address Downtown, Dubai, UAE. New Year’s Eve exterior cladding fire, 15 injured
• 2015 – Marina Torch, Dubai, UAE. Blaze spread via ACM façade over 40 floors; no fatalities
• 2014 – Lacrosse Tower, Melbourne, Australia. Fire raced 13 storeys in 11 minutes up aluminium composite cladding; no deaths
• 2012 – Tecom Building, Dubai. ACM with polyethylene core fuelled a multi-floor blaze with falling debris causing street-level danger.
• 2012 – Mermoz Tower, Roubaix, France. Flammable cladding led to fire spreading up the exterior, causing one death and six injuries.
• 2012 – Tamweel Tower, Dubai, UAE. Cigarette started fire spread up flammable cladding to the top
• 2012 – Al Tayer Tower, Sharjah. Fire progressed from external balcony to the top of the 40-storey tower due to thermoplastic-core sandwich panels
• 2011 - Wanxin Complex Fire, Shenyang. Caused by fireworks close to the Complex, launched to celebrate the Chinese New Year festival, particles from fireworks landed on 11th floor lower skirtings and ignited plastic grass which spread vertically. The facade of the towers was cladded with aluminium panels and aluminium composite panels (ACM). For Tower A, Expanded Polystyrene (EPS) foam was used as insulation and the cavity between the claddings and insulation varied from 170 to 600 mm, for Tower B, XPS was used as insulation and the cavity ranged from 190 mm to 600 mm. Investigation showed that the XPS used for Tower B was tested to have combustibility of Class B2 and the combustibility of the EPS used for Tower A was tested to be Class B1. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877705813012940?via%3Dihub
• 2010 – Dijon apartment block, France. A fire that started in a garbage container, quickly spread vertically across the façade of a nine-floor hostel, with strong winds pushing the fire towards the facade. The cladding was a thermoplastic expanded polystyrene (EPS) external thermal insulation composite systems (ETICS) or exterior Insulation and Finish System (EIFS) with a masonry finish. The fire led to 7 deaths and 11 injuries many from toxic smoke inhilation. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356696970_Fire_Performance_of_EPS_ETICS_Facade_Effect_of_Test_Scale_and_Masonry_Cover
• 2010 – Wooshin Golden Suites, Busan, South Korea. The building fwas clad with aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding with a polyethylene core, with glass wool and polystyrene insulation. Caused by a spark from electrical outlet on the 4th floor, the fire rapidly spread up the facade, reaching the top of the tower within 20 minutes. Five injuries were reported. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877705813012940?via%3Dihub
• 2010 Shanghai residential tower, China. Indication was that sparks from unlicensed welders working on the building ignited polyurethane (PU) trimmings, then the bamboo scaffolding and boards around the structure. The combustible cladding and the L shaped form caused rapid vertical spread, within 3 minutes, the fire reached the 20th and 21st floors, after 14 minutes the north facade had burnt and fire had spread into the apartments on floors 6th to 27th and onto the west and east facades along the envelope of the building. The fire killed 58 residents and injured 71. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877705813012940?via%3Dihub
• 2009 - Beijing Television Cultural Centre fire. It was confirmed that the cause of fire was the illegal use of highly explosive fireworks near the construction to celebrate Chinese New Years. The fire which started from the roof spread to the top facade edge metal panels igniting the Extruded Polystyrene (XPS) foam insulation and water proof sheets underneath the panels. The titanium-zinc alloy was reported to melt at about 400 oC. Cavities exist between the metal panels and the insulations, the melting and burning drops of XPS flew down through the facades. The fire then propagated to the lower floors. Fed by high winds, completely engulfing the tower in less than 20 min. One firefighter was killed and a number of people injured.
• 2009 – Lakanal House, Camberwell, London, UK. Fire caused by an electrical fault in a television on the ninth floor and rapidly spread through the cladding. The cladding product installed beneath the windows was high-pressure laminate (HPL) panels as part of a refurbishment project. The fire spread up the exterior cladding in 4½minutes, partly due to due to inadequate compartmentation as well as the combustible cladding and void behind. The fire resulted in six fatalities and numerous injuries.
• 2009 Apartment block, Miskolc, Hungary. the fire started in a kitchen on the 6th floor of the 10 floors and spread vertically spread across ETICS façade to the roof. The building had ben refurbished in 2007 using an ETICS system with polystyrene insulation. Smoke quickly spread through the staircase and pipe shafts which had not been properly insulated and three people were killed..
• https://www.grad.unizg.hr/images/50014277/Fire%20Protection%20of%20Facades.pdf
• 1991 Knowsley Heights, Liverpool - A fire of the rubbish in an external storage was started deliberately, at the building's base, it spread rapidly through GRP cladding, and lack of fire barriers within the cavity between the cladding and the building's walls. The fire rapidly engulfed the north side but no fatalities occurred. According to the BBC, the fire at Knowsley Heights involved cladding panels made by Arconic, the same company that manufactured the cladding used on Grenfell Tower. The refurbishment was funding by a government pilot scheme for cladding Housing Management Estates Action and the Building Research Establishment (BRE) had previously assessed the cladding and concluded that it did not pose a significant risk unless there were large cavities that could aid fire spread.

[edit] Related articles on Designing Buildings.

• 2022 changes to fire safety guidance and building regulations.
• ACM cladding.
• Advice for External Wall Insulation (EWI) systems with a render or brick-slip finish.
• AT Building Safety Hub.
• BS 8414 Fire performance of external cladding systems.
• BS 9991:2015 Fire safety in the design, management and use of residential buildings. Code of practice.
• BS 9999: Code of practice for fire safety in the design, management and use of buildings.
• Building a safer future: an implementation plan.
• Building Safety Act.
• Building Safety Charter.
• Building Safety Fund.
• Building safety in Wales.
• Building Safety Regulator.
• CIAT articles.
• CIAT publishes Principal Designer Competency Framework.
• Fire performance of external thermal insulation for walls of multistorey buildings, third edition (BR 135).
• Fire Safety Act.
• Framework.
• Golden thread guidance to be published by BSA.
• ‎Government response to the Building a Safer Future consultation.
• Grenfell Tower fire.
• Hackitt review of the building regulations and fire safety, final report.
• HPL cladding.
• Independent review of the building regulations and fire safety.
• Independent review of the construction products testing regime.
• Joint Competent Authority.
• Lakanal House fire.
• New CIAT Professional Standards Competency Framework.
• Non-ACM cladding.
• Raising the bar.
• Reform of building safety standards.
• Setting the bar.
• The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.
• The CIAT principal designer register.

[edit] External links

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c17g1wx4wlno

https://www.insidehousing.co.uk/news/government-sought-to-play-down-cladding-fire-at-pilot-project-it-funded-in-1990s-investigation-reveals-71116

https://gripclad.co.uk/blog/history-of-glass-reinforced-plastics-grp/

https://patents.google.com/patent/US4014726A/en

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877705813012940?ref=pdf_download&fr=RR-2&rr=95350db10cd0fe97

https://www.grad.unizg.hr/images/50014277/Fire%20Protection%20of%20Facades.pdf