Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 Report - Revision history

Designing Buildings at 14:56, 8 May 2024

2024-05-08T14:56:51Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:56, 8 May 2024
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	* Torre Windsor office building fire.		* Torre Windsor office building fire.

−	[[Category:DCN_Commentary]] [[Category:DCN_News]] [[Category:DCN_Report]] [[Category:News]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]] [[Category:Regulations]]	+	[[Category:DCN_Commentary]] [[Category:DCN_News]] [[Category:DCN_Report]] [[Category:News]] [[Category:Building_safety]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]] [[Category:Regulations]]

Designing Buildings at 08:38, 23 January 2021

2021-01-23T08:38:04Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 08:38, 23 January 2021
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	* Torre Windsor office building fire.		* Torre Windsor office building fire.

−	[[Category:~~News~~]] [[Category:DCN_News]] [[Category:~~Health_and_safety_/_CDM~~]] [[Category:~~Regulations~~]] [[Category:~~DCN_Regulation~~]]	+	[[Category:DCN_Commentary]] [[Category:DCN_News]] [[Category:DCN_Report]] [[Category:News]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]] [[Category:Regulations]]

Designing Buildings at 09:47, 31 October 2019

2019-10-31T09:47:41Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:47, 31 October 2019
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	In response to the report, General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, Matt Wrack, said: "The truth is that the fire spread the way it did because it was wrapped in flammable cladding. The firefighters turned up after that had happened, after the building had already been turned, in reality, into a death trap… Firefighters' actions on the night, which were remarkable in the circumstances, are now being scrutinised. Nobody is trying to avoid scrutiny, but we think that the ordering of the inquiry is completely back to front."		In response to the report, General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, Matt Wrack, said: "The truth is that the fire spread the way it did because it was wrapped in flammable cladding. The firefighters turned up after that had happened, after the building had already been turned, in reality, into a death trap… Firefighters' actions on the night, which were remarkable in the circumstances, are now being scrutinised. Nobody is trying to avoid scrutiny, but we think that the ordering of the inquiry is completely back to front."
		+
		+	The Construction Leadership Council (CLC) said: "The CLC believes that as an industry, we must collectively play our part in eliminating this risk on both new and existing buildings. Collectively, we must support all actions that are being taken to reform the industry ahead of the completion of the 2nd phase of the enquiry (sic). The CLC fully supports the work of the MHCLG and industry bodies in taking forward the agenda set by Dame Judith Hackitt, to improve standards of competence, improve the system of building regulation and to ensure the safety of construction products, and are ready to play our role in the necessary reform of the industry’s approach to fire and wider building safety." Ref [http://www.constructionleadershipcouncil.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Grenfell-Tower-Inquiry-CLC-Press-Release-30_10_19.pdf http://www.constructionleadershipcouncil.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Grenfell-Tower-Inquiry-CLC-Press-Release-30_10_19.pdf]

	Prime Minister Boris Johnson said: “Today, the whole country, the whole world, is finally hearing the truth about what happened at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017. For the survivors, the bereaved, and the local community, this report will prove particularly harrowing. Yet I hope it strengthens their faith in the inquiry’s desire to determine the facts of the fire – and in this government’s commitment to airing those facts in public, no matter how difficult they may be, and acting on them.”		Prime Minister Boris Johnson said: “Today, the whole country, the whole world, is finally hearing the truth about what happened at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017. For the survivors, the bereaved, and the local community, this report will prove particularly harrowing. Yet I hope it strengthens their faith in the inquiry’s desire to determine the facts of the fire – and in this government’s commitment to airing those facts in public, no matter how difficult they may be, and acting on them.”
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	* Torre Windsor office building fire.		* Torre Windsor office building fire.

−	[[Category:News]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]] [[Category:Regulations]]	+	[[Category:News]] [[Category:DCN_News]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]] [[Category:Regulations]] [[Category:DCN_Regulation]]

Designing Buildings at 11:19, 30 October 2019

2019-10-30T11:19:55Z

Designing Buildings at 11:15, 30 October 2019

2019-10-30T11:15:28Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:15, 30 October 2019
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	On 14 June 2017, a fire broke out in Grenfell Tower, a block of flats in North Kensington, London. The fire started shortly before 1 am and engulfed the building within 15 minutes. 72 people were eventually confirmed dead.		On 14 June 2017, a fire broke out in Grenfell Tower, a block of flats in North Kensington, London. The fire started shortly before 1 am and engulfed the building within 15 minutes. 72 people were eventually confirmed dead.

−	On 16 June 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May announced a Public Inquiry into the fire.	+	On 16 June 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May announced a [[Grenfell_Tower_Inquiry\|Public Inquiry]] into the fire.

	The Inquiry has been led by retired high court judge Sir Martin Moore-Bick and is in two phases:		The Inquiry has been led by retired high court judge Sir Martin Moore-Bick and is in two phases:

Designing Buildings at 11:12, 30 October 2019

2019-10-30T11:12:34Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:12, 30 October 2019
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	In response to the report, General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, Matt Wrack, said: "The truth is that the fire spread the way it did because it was wrapped in flammable cladding. The firefighters turned up after that had happened, after the building had already been turned, in reality, into a death trap… Firefighters' actions on the night, which were remarkable in the circumstances, are now being scrutinised. Nobody is trying to avoid scrutiny, but we think that the ordering of the inquiry is completely back to front."		In response to the report, General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, Matt Wrack, said: "The truth is that the fire spread the way it did because it was wrapped in flammable cladding. The firefighters turned up after that had happened, after the building had already been turned, in reality, into a death trap… Firefighters' actions on the night, which were remarkable in the circumstances, are now being scrutinised. Nobody is trying to avoid scrutiny, but we think that the ordering of the inquiry is completely back to front."
		+
		+	Prime Minister Boris Johnson said: “Today, the whole country, the whole world, is finally hearing the truth about what happened at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017. For the survivors, the bereaved, and the local community, this report will prove particularly harrowing. Yet I hope it strengthens their faith in the inquiry’s desire to determine the facts of the fire – and in this government’s commitment to airing those facts in public, no matter how difficult they may be, and acting on them. That commitment is absolute.”

	The full report can be found at: [https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report]		The full report can be found at: [https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report]

Designing Buildings at 11:08, 30 October 2019

2019-10-30T11:08:38Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:08, 30 October 2019
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	* The inspection and testing of lifts designed for use by firefighters.		* The inspection and testing of lifts designed for use by firefighters.
	* The evacuation of high-rise residential buildings.		* The evacuation of high-rise residential buildings.
−	* The provision of fire safety information to residents of high-rise residential buildings ~~and the marking of floor levels in lobbies and staircase landings~~.	+	* The provision of fire safety information to residents of high-rise residential buildings.
	* The inspection of fire doors and self-closing devices.		* The inspection of fire doors and self-closing devices.
		+	* Command and control and the handling of emergency calls.
		+	* Internal signage and fire doors.
		+	* Co-operation between emergency services.

	In response to the report, General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, Matt Wrack, said: "The truth is that the fire spread the way it did because it was wrapped in flammable cladding. The firefighters turned up after that had happened, after the building had already been turned, in reality, into a death trap… Firefighters' actions on the night, which were remarkable in the circumstances, are now being scrutinised. Nobody is trying to avoid scrutiny, but we think that the ordering of the inquiry is completely back to front."		In response to the report, General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, Matt Wrack, said: "The truth is that the fire spread the way it did because it was wrapped in flammable cladding. The firefighters turned up after that had happened, after the building had already been turned, in reality, into a death trap… Firefighters' actions on the night, which were remarkable in the circumstances, are now being scrutinised. Nobody is trying to avoid scrutiny, but we think that the ordering of the inquiry is completely back to front."

Designing Buildings at 11:01, 30 October 2019

2019-10-30T11:01:53Z

Designing Buildings at 10:48, 30 October 2019

2019-10-30T10:48:04Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:48, 30 October 2019
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−	[[File:~~Grenfell Inquiry phase 1 report~~.png\|link=https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report]]	+	[[File:Grenfell_Inquiry_phase_1_report.png\|link=https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report]]

	On 14 June 2017, a fire broke out in Grenfell Tower, a block of flats in North Kensington, London. The fire started shortly before 1 am and engulfed the building within 15 minutes. 72 people were eventually confirmed dead.		On 14 June 2017, a fire broke out in Grenfell Tower, a block of flats in North Kensington, London. The fire started shortly before 1 am and engulfed the building within 15 minutes. 72 people were eventually confirmed dead.
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	* The first phase looked into the development of the fire itself and the chain of events that unfolded before it was finally extinguished.		* The first phase looked into the development of the fire itself and the chain of events that unfolded before it was finally extinguished.
	* The second phase will consider how the building came to be so seriously exposed to the risk of a disastrous fire.		* The second phase will consider how the building came to be so seriously exposed to the risk of a disastrous fire.
		+
		+	For more information see: Grenfell Tower Inquiry.

	[https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 Report. Report of the Public Inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017] was published on 30 October 2019. However, the was issued to the bereaved, survivors and residents on 28 October 2019. Recipients were asked to sign a non-disclosure agreement, but despite this, the contents of the report were leaked in advance of its formal publication.		[https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 Report. Report of the Public Inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017] was published on 30 October 2019. However, the was issued to the bereaved, survivors and residents on 28 October 2019. Recipients were asked to sign a non-disclosure agreement, but despite this, the contents of the report were leaked in advance of its formal publication.
Line 40:		Line 42:

	The full report can be found at: [https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report]		The full report can be found at: [https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report]
		+
		+	= Related articles on Designing Buildings Wiki =
		+
		+	* ACM cladding.
		+	* Approved Document B.
		+	* BS 8414 Fire performance of external cladding systems.
		+	* Building a safer future: an implementation plan.
		+	* Celotex RS5000 PIR insulation.
		+	* CIAT response to Grenfell inquiry.
		+	* Fire performance of external thermal insulation for walls of multistorey buildings, third edition (BR 135).
		+	* Grenfell Tower articles.
		+	* Grenfell Tower fire
		+	* Grenfell Tower independent expert advisory panel.
		+	* Grenfell Tower Inquiry.
		+	* ICE Grenfell Tower review.
		+	* Independent review of the building regulations and fire safety.
		+	* Joint Competent Authority.
		+	* Lakanal House fire.
		+	* Ronan Point.
		+	* The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.
		+	* Torre Windsor office building fire.

Designing Buildings: Protected "Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 Report" ([edit=sysop] (indefinite) [move=sysop] (indefinite))

2019-10-30T10:35:18Z

Protected "Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 Report" ([edit=sysop] (indefinite) [move=sysop] (indefinite))

← Older revision

Revision as of 10:35, 30 October 2019

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:19, 30 October 2019
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	Although phase 1 of the Inquiry was not intended to consider the building itself, the report set out compelling evidence that the external walls of the building failed to comply with Requirement B4(1) of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations. It suggests that: “The principal reason why the flames spread so rapidly up, down and around the building was the presence of the aluminium composite material (ACM) rainscreen panels with polyethylene cores, which acted as a source of fuel.”		Although phase 1 of the Inquiry was not intended to consider the building itself, the report set out compelling evidence that the external walls of the building failed to comply with Requirement B4(1) of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations. It suggests that: “The principal reason why the flames spread so rapidly up, down and around the building was the presence of the aluminium composite material (ACM) rainscreen panels with polyethylene cores, which acted as a source of fuel.”

−	Fire compartments failed because:	+	Fire compartments then failed because:

	* The intensity of the heat was such that the glass in the windows failed, allowing the fire to penetrate flats.		* The intensity of the heat was such that the glass in the windows failed, allowing the fire to penetrate flats.
	* Extractor fan units in kitchens had a tendency to deform and become dislodged, providing a point of entry.		* Extractor fan units in kitchens had a tendency to deform and become dislodged, providing a point of entry.
−	* A number of key fire protection measures ~~inside the tower~~ failed. Although some fire doors held back the smoke, others did not. Some were left open and failed to close because they did not have effective self-closing devices, and others were broken down by firefighters or wedged open with firefighting equipment.	+	* A number of key fire protection measures failed. Although some fire doors held back the smoke, others did not. Some were left open and failed to close because they did not have effective self-closing devices, and others were broken down by firefighters or wedged open with firefighting equipment.

	In relation to the response of the emergency services, the Inquiry found that the London Fire Brigade’s (LFB’s) preparation and planning for such a fire was “gravely inadequate”, in particular:		In relation to the response of the emergency services, the Inquiry found that the London Fire Brigade’s (LFB’s) preparation and planning for such a fire was “gravely inadequate”, in particular:

−	* There had been no training in the ~~particular~~ dangers associated with combustible cladding.	+	* There had been no training in the dangers associated with combustible cladding.
	* Incident commanders had received no training in how to recognise the need for an evacuation or how to organise one.		* Incident commanders had received no training in how to recognise the need for an evacuation or how to organise one.
−	* Once it was clear ~~that~~ the compartmentation had failed, a decision should have been taken to evacuate the tower between 01.30 and 01.50. However, the best part of an hour was lost before the “stay put” advice was revoked.	+	* Once it was clear the compartmentation had failed, a decision should have been taken to evacuate the tower between 01.30 and 01.50. However, the best part of an hour was lost before the “stay put” advice was revoked.

	The report makes a wide range of recommendations, including recommendations in relation to:		The report makes a wide range of recommendations, including recommendations in relation to:

		+	* The evacuation of high-rise residential buildings.
	* The information made available to fire and rescue services about the construction of buildings.		* The information made available to fire and rescue services about the construction of buildings.
	* The availability of plans of high-rise residential buildings to local fire and rescue services.		* The availability of plans of high-rise residential buildings to local fire and rescue services.
	* The inspection and testing of lifts designed for use by firefighters.		* The inspection and testing of lifts designed for use by firefighters.
−	* The evacuation of high-rise residential buildings.
−	* The provision of fire safety information to residents of high-rise residential buildings.
	* The inspection of fire doors and self-closing devices.		* The inspection of fire doors and self-closing devices.
		+	* The provision of fire safety information to residents of high-rise residential buildings.
	* Command and control and the handling of emergency calls.		* Command and control and the handling of emergency calls.
−	* Internal signage ~~and fire doors~~.	+	* Internal signage.
	* Co-operation between emergency services.		* Co-operation between emergency services.

	In response to the report, General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, Matt Wrack, said: "The truth is that the fire spread the way it did because it was wrapped in flammable cladding. The firefighters turned up after that had happened, after the building had already been turned, in reality, into a death trap… Firefighters' actions on the night, which were remarkable in the circumstances, are now being scrutinised. Nobody is trying to avoid scrutiny, but we think that the ordering of the inquiry is completely back to front."		In response to the report, General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, Matt Wrack, said: "The truth is that the fire spread the way it did because it was wrapped in flammable cladding. The firefighters turned up after that had happened, after the building had already been turned, in reality, into a death trap… Firefighters' actions on the night, which were remarkable in the circumstances, are now being scrutinised. Nobody is trying to avoid scrutiny, but we think that the ordering of the inquiry is completely back to front."

−	Prime Minister Boris Johnson said: “Today, the whole country, the whole world, is finally hearing the truth about what happened at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017. For the survivors, the bereaved, and the local community, this report will prove particularly harrowing. Yet I hope it strengthens their faith in the inquiry’s desire to determine the facts of the fire – and in this government’s commitment to airing those facts in public, no matter how difficult they may be, and acting on them~~. That commitment is absolute~~.”	+	Prime Minister Boris Johnson said: “Today, the whole country, the whole world, is finally hearing the truth about what happened at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017. For the survivors, the bereaved, and the local community, this report will prove particularly harrowing. Yet I hope it strengthens their faith in the inquiry’s desire to determine the facts of the fire – and in this government’s commitment to airing those facts in public, no matter how difficult they may be, and acting on them.”

	The full report can be found at: [https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report]		The full report can be found at: [https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report]

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:01, 30 October 2019
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	For more information see: Grenfell Tower Inquiry.		For more information see: Grenfell Tower Inquiry.

−	[https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 Report. Report of the Public Inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017] was published on 30 October 2019. However, ~~the~~ was issued to the bereaved, survivors and residents on 28 October 2019. Recipients were asked to sign a non-disclosure agreement, but despite this, the contents of the report were leaked ~~in advance of its formal publication~~.	+	[https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 Report. Report of the Public Inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017] was formally published on 30 October 2019. However, it was issued to the bereaved, survivors and residents on 28 October 2019. Recipients were asked to sign a non-disclosure agreement, but despite this, the contents of the report were leaked.

	A post on the [https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/news/update-inquiry-20 Inquiry website] said: “The Chairman and the whole Inquiry team are very disappointed that someone has seen fit to disregard the confidential nature of the report during the embargo period. It is equally disappointing that media elected to publish what they would have been aware was subject to strict obligations of confidence.”		A post on the [https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/news/update-inquiry-20 Inquiry website] said: “The Chairman and the whole Inquiry team are very disappointed that someone has seen fit to disregard the confidential nature of the report during the embargo period. It is equally disappointing that media elected to publish what they would have been aware was subject to strict obligations of confidence.”

−	Although the ~~report~~ was not intended to consider the building itself, the ~~Inquiry found~~ compelling evidence that the external walls of the building failed to comply with Requirement B4(1) of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations. ~~The report~~ suggests that: “The principal reason why the flames spread so rapidly up, down and around the building was the presence of the aluminium composite material (ACM) rainscreen panels with polyethylene cores, which acted as a source of fuel.”	+	Although phase 1 of the Inquiry was not intended to consider the building itself, the report set out compelling evidence that the external walls of the building failed to comply with Requirement B4(1) of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations. It suggests that: “The principal reason why the flames spread so rapidly up, down and around the building was the presence of the aluminium composite material (ACM) rainscreen panels with polyethylene cores, which acted as a source of fuel.”

	Fire compartments failed because:		Fire compartments failed because:

	* The intensity of the heat was such that the glass in the windows failed, allowing the fire to penetrate flats.		* The intensity of the heat was such that the glass in the windows failed, allowing the fire to penetrate flats.
−	* Extractor fan units in ~~the~~ kitchens had a tendency to deform and become dislodged, providing a point of entry.	+	* Extractor fan units in kitchens had a tendency to deform and become dislodged, providing a point of entry.
	* A number of key fire protection measures inside the tower failed. Although some fire doors held back the smoke, others did not. Some were left open and failed to close because they did not have effective self-closing devices, and others were broken down by firefighters or wedged open with firefighting equipment.		* A number of key fire protection measures inside the tower failed. Although some fire doors held back the smoke, others did not. Some were left open and failed to close because they did not have effective self-closing devices, and others were broken down by firefighters or wedged open with firefighting equipment.

−	In relation to the response of the emergency services, the Inquiry found that the London Fire Brigade’s (LFB’s) preparation and planning for a fire ~~such as that at Grenfell Tower~~ was “gravely inadequate”, in particular:	+	In relation to the response of the emergency services, the Inquiry found that the London Fire Brigade’s (LFB’s) preparation and planning for such a fire was “gravely inadequate”, in particular:

	* There had been no training in the particular dangers associated with combustible cladding.		* There had been no training in the particular dangers associated with combustible cladding.
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	* Once it was clear that the compartmentation had failed, a decision should have been taken to evacuate the tower between 01.30 and 01.50. However, the best part of an hour was lost before the “stay put” advice was revoked.		* Once it was clear that the compartmentation had failed, a decision should have been taken to evacuate the tower between 01.30 and 01.50. However, the best part of an hour was lost before the “stay put” advice was revoked.

−	The report makes a wide range of recommendations, including:	+	The report makes a wide range of recommendations, including recommendations in relation to:

	* The information made available to fire and rescue services about the construction of buildings.		* The information made available to fire and rescue services about the construction of buildings.
Line 63:		Line 63:
	* The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.		* The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.
	* Torre Windsor office building fire.		* Torre Windsor office building fire.
		+
		+	[[Category:News]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]] [[Category:Regulations]]