FC Twente stadium roof collapse - Revision history

Designing Buildings at 08:17, 27 December 2020

2020-12-27T08:17:38Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 08:17, 27 December 2020
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	* Torre Windsor office building fire.		* Torre Windsor office building fire.

−	[[Category:~~Projects_and_case_studies~~]] [[Category:DCN_Project_Knowledge]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]]	+	[[Category:DCN_Commentary]] [[Category:DCN_Guidance]] [[Category:DCN_News]] [[Category:DCN_Project_Knowledge]] [[Category:Projects_and_case_studies]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]]

Designing Buildings at 11:51, 20 January 2020

2020-01-20T11:51:25Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:51, 20 January 2020
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	--[[User:Structural-Safety\|Structural-Safety]]		--[[User:Structural-Safety\|Structural-Safety]]

−	~~= Find out more =~~	+	= Related articles on Designing Buildings Wiki =
−		+
−	=== Related articles on Designing Buildings Wiki ===	+

	* De la Concorde overpass collapse.		* De la Concorde overpass collapse.
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	* Latent defects.		* Latent defects.
	* Patent defects.		* Patent defects.
		+	* Stadium.
	* Structural engineer.		* Structural engineer.
	* Structures at the end of their design life.		* Structures at the end of their design life.
	* Torre Windsor office building fire.		* Torre Windsor office building fire.

−	[[Category:Projects_and_case_studies]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]]	+	[[Category:Projects_and_case_studies]] [[Category:DCN_Project_Knowledge]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]]

Editor at 10:27, 23 June 2016

2016-06-23T10:27:47Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:27, 23 June 2016
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	* Structural engineer.		* Structural engineer.
	* Structures at the end of their design life.		* Structures at the end of their design life.
		+	* Torre Windsor office building fire.

	[[Category:Projects_and_case_studies]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]]		[[Category:Projects_and_case_studies]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]]

Editor at 15:26, 20 June 2016

2016-06-20T15:26:14Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:26, 20 June 2016
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−	This article addresses how the industry can learn from the fatal consequences of the collapse at the FC Twente Stadium in Holland in 2011~~, and the Dutch authorities are to be complimented on their rapid publication of the facts~~.	+	This article addresses how the industry can learn from the fatal consequences of the collapse at the FC Twente Stadium in Holland in 2011.

	The main aspects which flow out of the report are:		The main aspects which flow out of the report are:

Editor at 15:25, 20 June 2016

2016-06-20T15:25:52Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:25, 20 June 2016
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	* Operations should be signed off prior to follow-on trades starting.		* Operations should be signed off prior to follow-on trades starting.

−	What went wrong? ~~Well, simply~~, the planned sequence of operations necessary to build such a structure was not followed. It would appear that there were a number of reasons.	+	What went wrong? Simply, the planned sequence of operations necessary to build such a structure was not followed. It would appear that there were a number of reasons.

	# The erector’s programme of works was severely condensed.		# The erector’s programme of works was severely condensed.

Editor at 15:25, 20 June 2016

2016-06-20T15:25:30Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:25, 20 June 2016
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	What went wrong? Well, simply, the planned sequence of operations necessary to build such a structure was not followed. It would appear that there were a number of reasons.		What went wrong? Well, simply, the planned sequence of operations necessary to build such a structure was not followed. It would appear that there were a number of reasons.

−	1. The erector’s programme of works was severely condensed.	+	# The erector’s programme of works was severely condensed.
−		+	# Concurrent activities took place which should have been sequential to ensure stability at all times.
−	2. Concurrent activities took place which should have been sequential to ensure stability at all times.	+	# Respective tolerances were not allowed for in the design.
−		+	# Overly tight programme period allowed no float to rectify the lack of fit.
−	3. Respective tolerances were not allowed for in the design.	+	# Members were installed in a manner that induced stresses above working stresses.
−		+	# Members critical for temporary and permanent stability were not installed in sequence.
−	4. Overly tight programme period allowed no float to rectify the lack of fit.	+	# The structure was loaded in its temporary condition prior to completion of necessary stability members. Materials were loaded on the structure in a way that produced a temporary condition more onerous than the permanent condition.
−		+
−	5. Members were installed in a manner that induced stresses above working stresses.	+
−		+
−	6. Members critical for temporary and permanent stability were not installed in sequence.	+
−		+
−	7. The structure was loaded in its temporary condition prior to completion of necessary stability members. Materials were loaded on the structure in a way that produced a temporary condition more onerous than the permanent condition.	+

	It appears that overly-tight completion dates were allowed to drive the programme in an unsafe manner. The programme, whilst important, must never over-rule safety. The CDM regulations in the UK place a number of responsibilities onto the client, not least the need to ensure sufficient resources and time are allocated to all steps in the design and construction sequence.		It appears that overly-tight completion dates were allowed to drive the programme in an unsafe manner. The programme, whilst important, must never over-rule safety. The CDM regulations in the UK place a number of responsibilities onto the client, not least the need to ensure sufficient resources and time are allocated to all steps in the design and construction sequence.

Editor at 10:56, 16 June 2016

2016-06-16T10:56:05Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:56, 16 June 2016
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	* Defects in construction.		* Defects in construction.
	* Elements of structure in buildings.		* Elements of structure in buildings.
		+	* Elliot Lake Mall Inquiry.
	* Fit for purpose.		* Fit for purpose.
	* Latent defects.		* Latent defects.

Editor: Created page with "This article addresses how the industry can learn from the fatal consequences of the collapse at the FC Twente Stadium in Holland in 2011, and the Dutch authorities are to be com..."

2016-06-16T10:53:28Z

Created page with "This article addresses how the industry can learn from the fatal consequences of the collapse at the FC Twente Stadium in Holland in 2011, and the Dutch authorities are to be com..."

New page

This article addresses how the industry can learn from the fatal consequences of the collapse at the FC Twente Stadium in Holland in 2011, and the Dutch authorities are to be complimented on their rapid publication of the facts.

The main aspects which flow out of the report are:

* The main contractor must coordinate the activity of all subcontractors.
* There must be coordination of the design process and integration of the various interfaces to ensure there is good fit within the respective tolerances of the connecting components.
* Temporary conditions are often more onerous than permanent ones. Temporary works must be designed to accommodate temporary loads and any change to those loads should be advised to the temporary works designer to ensure those changes do not impact on his design.
* Sufficient time must be allocated to work activities.
* All activities should follow a defined method statement and sequence of work activities when critical to temporary stability. Any changes to that method statement and/or sequence should be referred to the originator/designer prior to any deviation.
* Operations should be signed off prior to follow-on trades starting.

What went wrong? Well, simply, the planned sequence of operations necessary to build such a structure was not followed. It would appear that there were a number of reasons.

1. The erector’s programme of works was severely condensed.

2. Concurrent activities took place which should have been sequential to ensure stability at all times.

3. Respective tolerances were not allowed for in the design.

4. Overly tight programme period allowed no float to rectify the lack of fit.

5. Members were installed in a manner that induced stresses above working stresses.

6. Members critical for temporary and permanent stability were not installed in sequence.

7. The structure was loaded in its temporary condition prior to completion of necessary stability members. Materials were loaded on the structure in a way that produced a temporary condition more onerous than the permanent condition.

It appears that overly-tight completion dates were allowed to drive the programme in an unsafe manner. The programme, whilst important, must never over-rule safety. The CDM regulations in the UK place a number of responsibilities onto the client, not least the need to ensure sufficient resources and time are allocated to all steps in the design and construction sequence.

It may seem obvious but a structure made up from a number of components needs to be erected in a logical sequence to ensure there is stability at all times. That is an overriding factor. Stability issues can change as other members get added but there must be a clear understanding of loads, their load paths and stability throughout. Until a portion of structural works is handed over there should be no additional load, apart from its self-weight, applied to it unless agreed in writing with the author of the erection method statement. Loading-out of follow-on trades’ material is often a critical load case so one must carefully plan the timing of that load application and its position within the structure. Not only can incorrectly placed material cause local failure, it can also cause structure instability and collapse: in particular, the absence of sufficient counterbalance material will cause a cantilever to overturn.

The appointment of a competent Temporary Works Coordinator and the proper implementation of BS5975:2008 + A1:2011, Code of practice for temporary works procedures and the permissible stress design of falsework, should help lead to an avoidance of such events. One weapon in the temporary works designer’s armoury should be the precedence diagram. This defines activities (and part activities) which cannot start until another is complete. This is more than a mere statement of the construction sequence. It specifies the unique, essential, basis for the temporary works stages and should be put on a drawing and issued to the contractor.

In conclusion:

* Appoint a Temporary Works Coordinator and assign responsibilities.
* Leave responsibility and control of risks and hazards with those who are competent and best placed to control them.
* Do not blur those lines.
* If B must follow A, then ensure that happens and do not deviate unless advised by the originator that it is safe to do so.
* Do not work to impossible programmes, no matter what the client wants.
* Better to be alive and a few days late.
* One would hope that following the UK CDM regulations would prevent such an occurrence .
* However, hope should not be part of a safety regime.

-----
This topic paper was published by SCOSS in July 2014. You can see the original paper [http://www.structural-safety.org/media/363023/fc-twente-stadium-roof-collapse-final-1-oct-12-revised-july-2014.pdf here].

--[[User:Structural-Safety|Structural-Safety]]

= Find out more =

=== Related articles on Designing Buildings Wiki ===

* De la Concorde overpass collapse.
* Defects in construction.
* Elements of structure in buildings.
* Fit for purpose.
* Latent defects.
* Patent defects.
* Structural engineer.
* Structures at the end of their design life.

[[Category:Projects_and_case_studies]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]]