De la Concorde overpass collapse - Revision history

Designing Buildings at 08:47, 15 November 2020

2020-11-15T08:47:15Z

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	* Torre Windsor office building fire.		* Torre Windsor office building fire.

−	[[Category:~~History~~]] [[Category:~~Projects_and_case_studies~~]] [[Category:DCN_Project_Knowledge]] [[Category:~~Health_and_safety_/_CDM~~]] [[Category:~~Regulations~~]] [[Category:~~DCN_Regulation~~]]	+	[[Category:DCN_Commentary]] [[Category:DCN_Guidance]] [[Category:DCN_News]] [[Category:DCN_Project_Knowledge]] [[Category:History]] [[Category:Projects_and_case_studies]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]] [[Category:Regulations]]

Editor at 11:19, 30 August 2019

2019-08-30T11:19:50Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:19, 30 August 2019
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−	{\|
−	~~\| [[File:Overpass collapse.jpg]]~~
−	\|}
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	= Introduction =		= Introduction =

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	* Torre Windsor office building fire.		* Torre Windsor office building fire.

−	[[Category:History]] [[Category:Projects_and_case_studies]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]] [[Category:Regulations]]	+	[[Category:History]] [[Category:Projects_and_case_studies]] [[Category:DCN_Project_Knowledge]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]] [[Category:Regulations]] [[Category:DCN_Regulation]]

Editor at 10:34, 30 August 2019

2019-08-30T10:34:24Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:34, 30 August 2019
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		+	{\|
		+	\| [[File:Overpass collapse.jpg]]
		+	\|}
		+
	= Introduction =		= Introduction =

Editor at 10:26, 30 August 2019

2019-08-30T10:26:35Z

Designing Buildings at 11:59, 7 January 2019

2019-01-07T11:59:09Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:59, 7 January 2019
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	--[[User:Structural-Safety\|Structural-Safety]]		--[[User:Structural-Safety\|Structural-Safety]]

−	= ~~Find out more~~ =	+	= Related articles on Designing Buildings Wiki =

−	~~=== Related articles on Designing Buildings Wiki ===~~
−
−	* Cracking and building movement.
−	* Defects correction period.
	* Defects in construction.		* Defects in construction.
−	* Elements of structure in buildings.
	* FC Twente stadium roof collapse.		* FC Twente stadium roof collapse.
−	* Fit for purpose.
	* Genoa bridge collapse.		* Genoa bridge collapse.
−	* ~~Latent defects~~.	+	* Grenfell Tower.
−	* ~~Patent defects~~.	+	* Inquiry into the construction of Edinburgh schools view of the RIAS.
		+	* Learning from the Genoa bridge collapse.
	* Ronan Point.		* Ronan Point.
−	* Structural engineer.
	* Structures at the end of their design life.		* Structures at the end of their design life.
−	* Structure definition.
	* Torre Windsor office building fire.		* Torre Windsor office building fire.

	[[Category:History]] [[Category:Projects_and_case_studies]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]] [[Category:Regulations]]		[[Category:History]] [[Category:Projects_and_case_studies]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]] [[Category:Regulations]]

Editor at 10:33, 15 August 2018

2018-08-15T10:33:22Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:33, 15 August 2018
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	The pressures on maintenance budgets will lead to a temptation to delay any remedial work if the safety of the structure can be justified (sweating the asset); although more sophisticated analysis can sometimes support this approach, it requires careful thought by those with suitable competency, and an appreciation of the long-term consequences.		The pressures on maintenance budgets will lead to a temptation to delay any remedial work if the safety of the structure can be justified (sweating the asset); although more sophisticated analysis can sometimes support this approach, it requires careful thought by those with suitable competency, and an appreciation of the long-term consequences.
−
−

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	* FC Twente stadium roof collapse.		* FC Twente stadium roof collapse.
	* Fit for purpose.		* Fit for purpose.
		+	* Genoa bridge collapse.
	* Latent defects.		* Latent defects.
	* Patent defects.		* Patent defects.

Editor at 11:29, 20 June 2017

2017-06-20T11:29:13Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:29, 20 June 2017
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	* Latent defects.		* Latent defects.
	* Patent defects.		* Patent defects.
		+	* Ronan Point.
	* Structural engineer.		* Structural engineer.
	* Structures at the end of their design life.		* Structures at the end of their design life.

Editor at 10:27, 23 June 2016

2016-06-23T10:27:29Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:27, 23 June 2016
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	* Structures at the end of their design life.		* Structures at the end of their design life.
	* Structure definition.		* Structure definition.
		+	* Torre Windsor office building fire.

	[[Category:History]] [[Category:Projects_and_case_studies]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]] [[Category:Regulations]]		[[Category:History]] [[Category:Projects_and_case_studies]] [[Category:Health_and_safety_/_CDM]] [[Category:Regulations]]

Editor at 13:59, 17 June 2016

2016-06-17T13:59:20Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:59, 17 June 2016
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−	This topic paper was issued by SCOSS in 2008.	+	This topic paper was issued by SCOSS in 2008. You can view the original [http://www.structural-safety.org/media/24195/133_de_la_Concorde_bridge_collapse_2008.pdf here].

	--[[User:Structural-Safety\|Structural-Safety]]		--[[User:Structural-Safety\|Structural-Safety]]

Editor at 10:54, 16 June 2016

2016-06-16T10:54:07Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:54, 16 June 2016
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	* Defects in construction.		* Defects in construction.
	* Elements of structure in buildings.		* Elements of structure in buildings.
		+	* FC Twente stadium roof collapse.
	* Fit for purpose.		* Fit for purpose.
	* Latent defects.		* Latent defects.

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:26, 30 August 2019
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	= Introduction =		= Introduction =

−	On 30th September 2006 the central ‘drop-in’ span of the de la Concorde highway over-bridge in Laval, Canada, suddenly collapsed onto the road below causing 5 fatalities and 6 injuries. This shocked both the ~~general~~ public and the professional ~~communities~~. A ~~Commission~~ of ~~Inquiry~~ was quickly established and reported in October 2007.	+	On 30th September 2006 the central ‘drop-in’ span of the de la Concorde highway over-bridge in Laval, Canada, suddenly collapsed onto the road below causing five fatalities and six injuries. This shocked both the public and the professional community. A commission of inquiry was quickly established and reported in October 2007.

−	The Commission concluded that the collapse was due to a number of factors, none of which was sufficient in itself to cause failure, but which came together on that day. They reflected both technical shortcomings, and human failings: the latter amounted to negligence in respect of the construction, and serious lapses in the management of the structure throughout its life.	+	The Commission concluded that the collapse was due to a number of factors, none of which was sufficient in itself to cause failure, but which came together on that day. They reflected both technical shortcomings and human failings: the latter amounted to negligence in respect of the construction, and serious lapses in the management of the structure throughout its life.

−	The de la Concorde overpass structure was built in the 1960s as part of Canada’s post-war infrastructure expansion. The structure was innovative for its time in the manner in which the central span was designed- allowing a single span over the roadway. The in-situ side spans had raking columns. A short cantilever, ending in a half-joint, picked- up the central ‘drop-in span’ of precast prestressed concrete boxes placed side by side. The structure failed at the half joint.	+	The de la Concorde overpass structure was built in the 1960s as part of Canada’s post-war infrastructure expansion. The structure was innovative for its time in the manner in which the central span was designed – allowing a single span over the roadway. The in-situ side spans had raking columns. A short cantilever, ending in a half-joint, picked- up the central ‘drop-in span’ of precast prestressed concrete boxes placed side by side. The structure failed at the half joint.

	The Commission gave early warning to the authorities of shortcomings they had discovered in the design standards for thick slabs without shear reinforcement in the presence of concrete deterioration. As a consequence, the maintenance inspection standards, and associated quality controls for highway bridges, have been reviewed throughout Canada.		The Commission gave early warning to the authorities of shortcomings they had discovered in the design standards for thick slabs without shear reinforcement in the presence of concrete deterioration. As a consequence, the maintenance inspection standards, and associated quality controls for highway bridges, have been reviewed throughout Canada.
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	The Commission of Inquiry concluded that the fate of the structure was found to be determined by:		The Commission of Inquiry concluded that the fate of the structure was found to be determined by:

−	* Poor design (although in accordance with contemporary codes).	+	* Poor design (although in accordance with contemporary codes);
−	* Failure on the part of the designers to look beyond the design code.	+	* Failure on the part of the designers to look beyond the design code;
−	* Poor quality control and supervision during construction.	+	* Poor quality control and supervision during construction;
−	* Deterioration over its life as a consequence of poor quality materials, salt contaminated water and freeze-thaw cycles.	+	* Deterioration over its life as a consequence of poor quality materials, salt contaminated water and freeze-thaw cycles;
−	* Poor maintenance and repair procedures.	+	* Poor maintenance and repair procedures;
−	* Inaccessibility of critical elements.	+	* Inaccessibility of critical elements, and
	* Failure by the maintaining authorities to act decisively.		* Failure by the maintaining authorities to act decisively.

−	Although the UK’s procedures differ from those of Canada, the conclusions drawn by the Commission should be carefully considered, ~~viz~~:	+	Although the UK’s procedures differ from those of Canada, the conclusions drawn by the Commission should be carefully considered, namely:

−	* Failure of parties to discharge their contractual responsibilities in respect of quality control and supervision during ~~the~~ construction.	+	* Failure of parties to discharge their contractual responsibilities in respect of quality control and supervision during construction;
−	* Failure of the maintaining authority to relate the maintenance regime to the needs of the structure and its risk profile; inspections were not allocated sufficient time and lacked proper consideration.	+	* Failure of the maintaining authority to relate the maintenance regime to the needs of the structure and its risk profile; inspections were not allocated sufficient time and lacked proper consideration, and
	* No one shortcoming was dominant in the cause of the collapse: it resulted from an accumulation of shortcomings over time.		* No one shortcoming was dominant in the cause of the collapse: it resulted from an accumulation of shortcomings over time.

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	= Commentary =		= Commentary =

−	The need to undertake an assessment of highway structure proposals from a holistic perspective stands out from this incident. Good design does not just stem from application of design codes. It requires consideration of aspects ~~outwith~~ many codes: buildability, required supervision levels, ease of maintenance and whole-life costings.	+	The need to undertake an assessment of highway structure proposals from a holistic perspective stands out from this incident. Good design does not just stem from the application of design codes. It requires consideration of aspects beyond many codes: buildability, required supervision levels, ease of maintenance and whole-life costings.

	The UK has developed good practice both within HA and at national level (for example the new HA Bridge Inspection Manual and the CSS Code of Practice for Management of Highway Structures).		The UK has developed good practice both within HA and at national level (for example the new HA Bridge Inspection Manual and the CSS Code of Practice for Management of Highway Structures).